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THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES AND CONTRACTUAL
NETWORKS

Alan Schwartz* and Robert E. Scott**

ABSTRACT
An increasing trend of economic agents isto form productive associations such as networks, platforms, and other hybrids. Subsets of these agents contract with each other to
further their network project and these contracts can create benefits for, or impose costs
on, agents who are not contract parties. Contract law regulates third party claims against
contract parties with the third-party beneficiary doctrine, which directs courts to ask
whether the contracting parties "intended" to benefit a particular third party. We show
here what courts do with third party claims when network members fail to perform for
third parties and what the law's best responses to such breaches should be. Among our
principal results are that courts honor third party claims when contract members likely
can price them and when third parties incur substantial reliance losses, but protect thirdparty interests lessfrequently than they should and refuse relief when contract members
can identify the potential beneficiary class but not every agent who is likely to be in it.

1. INTRODUCTION
A recent and increasing trend of economic agents is to form productive asso-

ciations such as networks, platforms, and other hybrids.' A distinguishing feature of these associations is that they create a particular form of spillover. The
typical contract is dyadic: it has two parties. Associations-referred to generically here as "networks"-have N > 2 members, but the members seldom write
"master contracts" that everyone signs. Rather, subsets of members contract
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Much current economic analysis of networks involves individual behavior. The analyst's goal is to
understand such issues as the effectiveness of a micro finance project or how a vaccination campaign
would function. A good review is Jackson (2014). Because our concern is business behavior, we do
not use this literature.
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with each other or create framework agreements that they and later parties join.
These agreements may create benefits for, or impose costs on, agents that are
not parties. For example, consider a set of banks, merchants, and consumers.
Typically, Bank B 1 enters into an agreement with merchant M that B1 and other
banks in BI's group will process credit card payments that consumers make to
M, and, in turn, M agrees to take certain precautions to reduce the likelihood of
fraud or unauthorized use. By taking these precautions, M will increase the
payoffs of group member banks B2 and B3, but their payoffs will decrease if the
precautions are not taken. Neither bank B2 nor bank B3 contracts directly with
M, however.
The legal concerns that occupy us begin with the two facts just noted: transaction costs commonly preclude creating master contracts; and network agreements can create externalities. To be sure, dyadic contracts create externalities
as well. A bank that writes improvident mortgage contracts imposes costs on
people who deal with the mortgagor and on society at large. The definitional
difficulty, therefore, is to know when affected non-parties are in or outside the
relevant network. At first blush, observers probably would not put the mortgagor's neighbor in the same network as the mortgagor, though the value of the
neighbor's house would fall if the mortgagor defaulted. On the other hand, the
retail merchant and the three banks described above plainly seem in a network
with each other.
We approach the definitional question functionally. Parties that contract
with each other-the merchant and Bank B1 in the example above-we refer
to below as "contract members". Affected non-parties are in the relevant
network-they are "beneficiary members"-if there is a good reason to include
them. A good reason should derive from what we believe is the appropriate state
goal: to facilitate the founding and performance of efficient networks.
Notwithstanding the significance of this larger normative question, in this article we are concerned with two narrower but related legal questions: when can
(and should) a third party be able to hold a contract member liable either for
benefits the third party did not receive or costs it incurred? Thus, we are
pursuing only a part of the broader question of how the state should facilitate
the founding and performance of efficient networks. Because we ask this question through the lens of contract law, we are only looking at a small part of that
question.
We approach the legal question by asking just when the goals of contract
members would be materially furthered by the participation of particular third
parties, or classes of third parties. Our more precise normative claim is that a
court should find for a potential beneficiary member if contract member goals
would be furthered by the participation of third parties in the class to which the
plaintiff belongs. This claim rests on two premises. First, ex ante, contract
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members want the law to accord third-party beneficiary status to members of
the plaintiff's class when and because their participation would increase the
contract members' expected payoffs. In many network contexts the payoffs of
members are increasing, over a range, in the population that consumes network
services. As an illustration, insurance companies sometimes contract with hospitals to have the hospitals serve the companies' insureds. The payoffs of these
contract members are increasing in the number of insureds that there are.
Hence, an insured whom a hospital refuses to serve is a good candidate for
beneficiary member status. Our second premise is that there is a positive,
2
though imperfect, correlation between network welfare and social welfare.
The practical implication of this premise is that when the criterion of network
welfare would lead to a denial of beneficiary member status, a potential beneficiary member has the burden of showing that the denial would be inefficient
all things considered.
In Section II we introduce the relevant contract law. Current doctrine directs
courts to ask whether the relevant contract evidences an "intention" on the part
of the contract parties to "confer a benefit" on the third-party plaintiff. The
courts' question and ours are related: network members who would benefit
from third party participation want to benefit these parties in order to induce
them to participate. The cases sometimes deviate from the results our criterion
implies, however, because when party intent is not obvious courts do not ask
how a case outcome would advance or retard the particular network's economic
goals. This, we show, can lead a court to deny third-party beneficiary status
when application of our economic criterion would imply granting it. Hence,
our analysis has normative implications.
Section III illustrates some actual networks that feature in litigation. In particular, this section argues that, broadly speaking, contract members benefit
from the participation of third parties in two ways. First, as noted above, contract members benefit when their payoffs are increasing in the number of third
parties that join the network either as suppliers, consumers or co-venturers in
the common enterprise. Second, contract members benefit when third party
participation would assist the members in creating a particular product-a
piece of software or a new drug-or in creating standards that products
should meet.

2

Because the correlation between network welfare and social welfare is imperfect, our normative
views are tentatively held. An additional justification for adopting network welfare as a criterion is
that normative critique, when directed at courts, should take into account the type of goal a court
can implement. Courts are not equipped to make global welfare assessments, but should be able to
discern whether permitting or denying a third party suit would better advance network goals.
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In equilibrium, agents commonly perform their contracts so there is a question how cases come to court. Section IV shows that contract members do not
perform for or with potential beneficiary members-they "breach"for two reasons. First, as expected, contract members breach when performance costs rise
or revenues fall. These breaches create vexing problems for courts and for
parties. On the one hand, a breach motivated by increased costs (or reduced
revenues) supports an inference that the contract member would otherwise
have performed. The third party thus should win for the same reason an ordinary promisee wins; that a promisor's payoff turns negative cannot justify
breach. On the other hand, the set of third parties that want to join a particular
network may be larger than the set that the network can profitably support.
Network members do not want to confer benefits on third parties when this
would cost them money. The question cases sometimes pose, therefore, is
whether a particular plaintiff is (or is not) in the set the network ex ante
wanted to serve. It is difficult for courts to delimit the set of beneficiary members and it can be difficult for a network member to notify possible beneficiaries
that their presence is wanted or not.
Second, and perhaps less obviously, network members breach by free loading. As an example, when the project is to discover information of commercial
value the performance of contract members and third parties may be substitutes: agent A may benefit from the information that agent B develops. As a
consequence, every agent has an incentive to invest less in developing information than it agreed to invest ex ante in the hope that other agents will invest
more. Such defections reduce the likelihood of network success and, if parties
anticipate them, may prevent a network from forming. Courts therefore should
attempt to discourage free loading defections by ruling that injured third parties
3
are beneficiary members.
Our analysis in Section IV generates predictions of what courts that are partly
responsive to economic considerations will do. Section V tests these predications against a random sample of recent third-party beneficiary cases. Here we
attempt to enhance understanding of how courts handle network cases. We find
the case outcomes largely consistent with three predictions: Third party claims
are more likely to be granted (i) when the network member promisor becomes
sufficiently aware of the third party, in the negotiation process or otherwise, to
price the cost of serving that party: that network members can price the cost of
serving particular possible beneficiaries suggests that the members ex ante

3

Damages may be an issue in these cases. Thus, if a network project never comes into existence, the

payoffs it would have generated may be impossible to assess. In that case, courts could not award the
standard expectancy remedy of putting the promisee in the same position performance would have
done. Granting costs incurred may be the best a court can practically do.
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intended to serve those beneficiaries, (ii) when a potential beneficiary attaches
substantial value to the performance, as is evidenced by the costs the beneficiary
has incurred in preparation to perform (the existence and extent of these costs
likely correlates positively with a reasonable beneficiary expectation that the
network members intended to serve him), and (iii) when the network identifies
its members in advance (the problem of delimiting the set of beneficiary members does not arise when network size is fixed ex ante).
Section VI next contrasts what courts actually do with what our normative
analysis suggests that they should do. Here we show that current third-party
doctrine is too restrictive when applied to network environments: Some third
parties do prevail when this would advance contract member goals but other
third party claims fail even though our normative criterion would argue that
they deserve to be beneficiary members. As examples, a third-party plaintiff is
less likely to succeed when the particular members of his possible beneficiary
class become more difficult to identify. Yet, contract members may want to
benefit members of such "vague classes" if they can anticipate class size.
Moreover, courts do not require contract members to notify potential third
parties that they intend to restrict service when notice is possible to give, and
some courts create a strong presumption against finding third-party beneficiary
liability. We argue that both of these rules are unjustified.
We summarize our findings in Section VII and emphasize several additional
points in conclusion. First, one goal in this article is to facilitate the resolution
of disputes where the contract is unclear about the right of third parties to
recover for contract breach. Courts today will exclude third parties that dyadic
contracts expressly exclude and they will include third parties that these contracts expressly include. But contracts are silent in many cases. Thus, a part of
our purpose is to derive criteria for a "third party default." The current default
is no liability unless the parties so intend. Under this default, intent can be
manifested with the usual evidence: words, recitals, circumstances, actions. We
accept this default but clarify it. When the usual evidence is inconclusive, courts
commonly ask which interpretation would advance the parties' goals. The
problem for current courts is that they do not understand what the parties'
goals are in the network context, and how best to implement those goals. Our
article fills in these blanks.
Second, we stress again that our analysis is preliminary. For many years,
third-party beneficiary law has languished in the backwaters of contract: the
subject is rarely taught, has been given only minimal scholarly treatment-the
last serious article was published almost 23 years ago (Eisenberg 1992; Waters
1985)-and has been completely ignored by law and economics scholars. The
law, however, is not waiting for scholarly wisdom. There has been a significant
increase in the quantity of litigation in the past two decades. Our recent search
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found over 1,400 appellate cases between 2004-2014 involving claims to contract performance by third parties. These appellate cases are only the tip of the
iceberg. In addition, while there has been much recent progress in network
game theory, the economists, so far, have not studied the issues of breach
and strategic defection that necessarily occupy lawyers. Hence, the existing
economic wisdom is less helpful here than it usually is. Yet, despite the reasons
for caution, we nevertheless believe that our positive and normative results will
increase understanding of how the law affects, and can affect, network
performance.
2. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
The typical dyadic contract-"the bilateral contract" in legal languagespecifies a performance by a promisor to be rendered in exchange for a
return promise or performance. Notions of freedom of contract as well as
norms of efficiency and autonomy imply that the right to this performance
only runs to the promisee or to his contractual designee. That only a party to a
dyadic contract-a party in "privity of contract"-could claim the contract's
benefits was the common law for several hundred years. Starting in the midnineteenth century, and moving at a faster pace today, courts have relaxed the
privity rule to permit third parties to claim rights to a contract performance
under certain conditions. In a recent case, Judge Richard Posner explained the
new judicial intuition: If the parties to the contract make clear their intention
that third parties are permitted to enforce the contract's terms, "permitting
third- party-beneficiary suits is consistent with freedom of contract, and also
reduces transaction costs by conferring rights (though of course not liabilities)
on persons without requiring the persons to become involved in the contractual
negotiations.",4 This central focus on the "intent" of the contracting parties as
the precondition for extending rights to third parties remains the courts' core
concern. Intent, however, is a conclusion, not a working concept. Other than
express contractual language, courts have not clarified the factors that do and
should generate the conclusion.
2.1 The Evolving Common Law

The rule precluding third party recovery against the contract parties prevailed
in England until overturned by Act of Parliament in 1999. In the USA, thirdparty liability was first recognized in 1859 in Lawrence v. Fox.5 In that case, Fox

4

A.FI. Music Network, Inc. v. Business Computers, Inc. et al., 290 F. 3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 2002).

5

20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
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promised Holly that in return for a $300 loan he would pay Holly's debt to
Lawrence, who was not a party to the contract. The New York court held that
the third party, Lawrence, could recover the amount of the loan directly from
the promisor, Fox. Thus was born the so-called "creditor beneficiary" line of
cases, granting a third-party beneficiary the right to a performance that would
extinguish a debt owed that party by the promisee. 6 Subsequently, in Seaver v.
Ransom,7 the New York court extended enforcement rights to the third-party
beneficiary when the promisee contracted with the promisor to secure a performance that was explicitly for the benefit of the third party. These were the
8
"donee beneficiary" cases.
The First Restatement of Contracts attempted to formalize these developments. 9 It provided that a putative third-party beneficiary could recover directly
from the promisor if the third party qualified as: (i) a donee beneficiary because
the promisee intended to confer the promised performance as a gift to the third
party, (ii) a donee beneficiary because the promisee intended to confer on the
third party a right to the promised performance not based on any duty the
promisee owed the third party, and (iii) a creditor beneficiary because the promisee intended to confer a right on the third party to recover from the promisor in
payment of an obligation the promisee owed to the third party.
The First Restatement's formulation was short lived, however. Instead, courts
began to substitute a broad standard of intent in place of the Restatement's
more precise rules: The standard directed courts to ask whether the promisee
(or in some courts both parties) intended to benefit the third party. Responding
to the dominant trend in the case law, the Second Restatement of Contracts
endorsed the intent standard and abandoned the labels "creditor" and "donee"
beneficiary. Importantly, however, the Second Restatement added a further
criterion for finding third-party beneficiary status. Section 302(1) provides
that the third-party beneficiary is an intended beneficiary (and thus entitled
to recover against the promisor) if (1) recognizing a right to the performance
would effectuate the contract parties' intentions, and (2) ... the circumstances
indicate that the promisee intended to give the beneficiary the benefit of the
promised performance. Section (2) then provides that an incidentalbeneficiary
is one who is not an intended beneficiary under section (1).10

6 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302, comment b.
7 224 N.Y.233 (1918).
8 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302, comment c.
9 Restatement (First) of Contracts § 133 (1932).
10 The concept of unqualified third parties as "incidental" beneficiaries was first developed by Judge
Cardozo in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160 (1928).
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2.2 The Modern Rule

Contemporary courts today retain the common law's no-liability default; that
is, the courts generally follow the "intend to benefit" rule and limit third-party
enforcement of contractual terms to intended, rather than incidental, beneficiaries.11 As Melvin Eisenberg (1992) has noted, however, "the term 'intent' is
deeply ambiguous" along several dimensions: Does it mean acting with a
motive to achieve a result or knowing the result is likely to follow? Does it
refer to the "ends" the actor seeks to achieve or the "means" to those ends?
(Kraus & Scott 2009). Courts have yet to clarify the "intent" standard. 12 A law
and economics analysis would support an objective, functional test, but courts,
lacking such an analysis, differ in their understanding of intent, looking variously to "clear", "express" or "definite" evidence of the promisor's contracting
goals.
Despite the uncertainty that attends the intent test, the Second Restatement
formulation, and in particular the distinction between incidental and intended
beneficiaries, has been influential in framing judicial decisions in recent decades. In 1985, New York (the leading commercial jurisdiction in the USA)
expressly adopted the Restatement test in Fourth Ocean Putnam Corp. v.
Interstate Wrecking Co.13 Although judicial use of the intended/incidental distinction is common, the courts have not developed criteria for finding the
parties' intent. Some courts follow a formalist "four corners" approach and
14
require that intent be found in the express language of the written contract.
But the majority of modern courts follows the Restatement's lead and looks to

11

See, e.g., Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County, Cal., 131 S. Ct. 1342, 1347 (2011) ("A nonparty
becomes legally entitled to a benefit promised in a contract ... only if the contracting parties so
intend."). Accord, BIS ComputerSolutions, Inc. v. City ofRichmond, 122 Fed. App'x 608, 611 (4th Cir.
2005) (incidental beneficiaries may not bring breach of contract claims).

12 Eisenberg (1992) suggests that in place of the vague intent standard, courts substitute a "third party
beneficiary principle": The third party can recover only ifi (i) enforcement is necessary to effectuate
both contracting parities' performance objectives (as determined by surrounding conditions, etc.,
etc.,) or (ii) enforcement is justified by reasons of policy or morality. Eisenberg (1992) then reviews a
number of cases to suggest that his test explains the differing outcomes. The "third party beneficiary
principle" seems unhelpful, however, because Eisenberg does not specify the reasons of policy or
morality precisely. When all involved parties can contract with each other, they have the usual
incentive to substitute precise rules for vague standards, such as the intent standard here. We are
informed that construction trade associations in England advise their members to contract out of
the Act of 1999.
13 66 N.Y. 2d 38 (1985).
14 See e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fireguard Corp., 249 Va. 209 (1995). ("As Virginia is a state
employing the 'four corners' doctrine" one must show the "clear and definite intention" of the
parties to confer a benefit upon the third party for third party beneficiary status to emerge. The
court is not free to look beyond the written contract when it is "complete on its face" with "plain and
unambiguous" terms. Id. at 215.) See also, Nitro Distributing,Inc. v. Dunn, 194 S.W.3d 339, 345
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the surrounding circumstances to see whether the contract parties intended to
confer rights on the putative third-party beneficiary. 1 5 The Restatement approach thus is generally more hospitable to claims by potential beneficiary
members, but it and the courts permit contract members expressly to exclude
6
third-party liability.'
Consistent with a no-liability default, jurisdictions that allow extrinsic evidence to prove intent place the burden of establishing third-party beneficiary
status on the party claiming it. 17 Some courts go further to apply a "strong
presumption" that a contract is intended for the benefit only of the contracting
parties, but will accept an implied showing of intent to benefit third-parties
when "the implication that the contract applies to third parties [is] so strong as
to be practically an express declaration."' 8 And in several jurisdictions, extrinsic
evidence that an alleged third-party beneficiary was not an intended beneficiary
of the contract may suffice to defeat claims even when the contract itself appears
9
to create third-party rights.'
Important collateral issues arise as to when the promisor can raise a defense
against the beneficiary's right to enforce the contract. The courts all agree that
the alleged beneficiary has the burden of proving the "circumstances" that
establish the necessary intent, and that the promisor can raise against the

(Mo. 2006) ("[t]o be bound as a third party beneficiary, the terms of the contract must clearly
express intent to benefit that party or an identifiable class of which the party is a member").
15 See Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying
Pennsylvania law and noting its adoption of the Restatement approach). Accord Klamath Water
Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1999) (adopting Restatement
approach to third party beneficiary law).
16 See In re TJX Co. Retail Sec. Breach Litigation, 564 F.3d 489, 499 (lst Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal
of breach of contract claim by credit card issuer because contract between acquirer and merchant
contained a clause stating " [t] his Agreement is for the benefit of, and may be enforced only by, Bank
and Merchant ... and is not for the benefit of, and may not be enforced by any third party.").
17 See, e.g., ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Communications,Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (applying New York law).
18 Quinn v. McGraw Hill Co., 168 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1999) (investor is not a third party beneficiary
of contract between issuer and ratings agency and thus cannot recover for losses stemming from the
credit downgrade of certain collateralized mortgage obligations). Accord Retro Television Network,
Inc. v. Luken Commc'n, LLC, 696 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 2012) ("In Arkansas, '[a] contract is
actionable by a third party when there is substantial evidence of a clear intention to benefit that
third party."').
19 See ActiveVideo, 168 F.3d at 1336 (Verizon alleged that it was the intended beneficiary of a contract
between ActiveVideo and TV Guide that contained a covenant not to sue customers and licensees of
TV guide. The court rejected this argument, even though Verizon was a customer and licensee of TV
Guide, because ActiveVideo presented evidence that the covenant applied "only to licensees of the
product that was to be jointly developed.")
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third party any defenses he has against the promisee (Scott & Kraus 2013,
p. 992).20 Courts also generally agree that the promisor and the promisee can
mutually agree to modify the contract and that the beneficiary is bound by the
modification. The beneficiary is typically entitled to recover verifiable reliance
costs incurred prior to the modification but cannot recover her lost expectancy.2' A difficult question for many courts is whether the promisor can raise a
defense that the promisee would have had against the beneficiary. Here the
courts are split. Restatement section 309(3) does not permit the promisor to
raise defenses other than those that render the contract voidable or unless the
contract provides otherwise, on the doctrinal grounds that the beneficiary's
22
rights are direct and not derivative.
We conclude this summary of contract doctrine with two points that we will
defend in the analysis that follows: (a) a strong presumption against permitting
third parties to advance contract claims has no economic support, and (b) the
modern receptivity to surrounding circumstances evidence gives courts a
greater ability to ask the right questions, but it does not indicate what those
questions are.
2.3 The Increase in Third-Party Litigation and the Rise of Business Networks
In the last several decades, there has been a marked increase in litigated claims
of third-party beneficiary status. We discovered over 1,400 cases in the past
decade (2004-2014) that discuss the distinction between intended and incidental beneficiaries. 2 3 Many, if not most, of the cases involve disputes over the
performance the promisor owes to the promisee and to potential beneficiary
members and business networks feature in many of them.
In the current view, a contractual network consists of a number of independent firms that form relationships, some of which are contractual, in order
to realize for network members co-ordination benefits that the firms would
less efficiently achieve through vertical integration. Some networks have a
"hub and spoke" design-such as a franchise; others form a chain of bilateral
contracts-i.e., "farm to fork" supply chains; others combine a hub with

20 Restatement (Second) of Contract § 309(4).
21 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311. We argue below that restricting a beneficiary to a
reliance recovery is inefficient in some cases.
22 According to the Restatement, the third party is not subject to defenses that the promisor had
against the promisee, except for fraud or other infirmity that makes the contract voidable ab
initio or other defenses based on impracticability or public policy. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 309(1)(2),(3).
23 See Dane Thorley, Analysis of Third Party Claims in Random Sample of Contracts, 7/17/2014
(memo on file with the authors).
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lengthy spokes consisting of chains of contracts, such as a large construction
project. And still others form a cluster of firms whose membership shifts over
time. Here the primary exemplars are standard setting alliances, credit card
networks and the tech transfer network consisting of a university/research
entity, a number of biotechs, large pharmas and venture capital firms
(Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr 1996; Powell 1996)). The network form implicates the issue of third-party rights when network members contract only
with their neighbors but these contracts affect other members or potential
members.
Networks commonly enforce agreements among members relationally, relying on the standard mix of reputation, repeat play and tit for tat reciprocity. But
standard theory would predict that informal enforcement fails in many settings.
The key question then becomes when would inter-party legal liability advance
network goals? 24 The courts' inability to come up with predictable answers to
this question accounts for much of the current litigation.
We begin to fill this gap by confronting a first order question: Why can't
agents write a "master contract" that explicitly binds network members? The
answer is that sometimes they do. General Motor's master contract for its
25
dealers binds them all as does John Deere's relationship with its suppliers.
Master contracts typically only work in hub and spoke arrangements or in stable
supply chains, however. Otherwise, master agreements cannot solve the relevant
contracting problems. In many cases, the size of the network generates collective
action and coordination problems. Moreover, the networks are often not
stable-the membership changes over time. Technology and the information
revolution have increased the levels of uncertainty and, in turn, this has led to
an ongoing search for new partners. In consequence, in many business networks
the master contract solution is impracticable owing to excessively hightransactions costs.

24 The German scholar Gunther Teubner (2011) has written extensively about networks and has

considered the question of contract members liability under the Civil Code. He argues that the
essential elements for granting legal rights to third parties are: (i) a constellation of connected
contracts, (ii) mutual referencing of these contracts to one another (i.e., contracts refer to activities

governed by other contracts), (iii) a network purpose (separate from the purpose of the individual
bilateral contracts), and (iv) intensive factual cooperation between all the different parties, not
merely those bound by explicit bilateral contracts (i.e., a relational enforcement mechanism).
Italy has recently adopted legislation designed to facilitate the enforcement of network contracts
(Ferrari 2010) (noting Italy's 2009 adoption of a "Network Contract Law").

25 See e.g., Component Supply Agreement between American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. and General
Motors Corporation (June 5, 1998) (requirements contract for motor vehicle components to be
supplied by AAM to GMM); Long Term Agreement between John Deere & Company and Stanadyne
Corporation (5 year supply contract for the purchase of fuel filtration systems, injection nozzles and
related products by Deere from Stanadyne).
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3. THE NETWORK CONTEXT
We introduce here frequent network types that feature in the cases. Credit card
networks occupy considerable judicial time. These networks are composed of
"issuers," financial institutions that issue credit cards to consumers pursuant to
bilateral contracts, and "acquirers," banks that process payments for merchants
who agree to accept credit cards as payment for their goods and services. 26 Each
bank in the network has a membership agreement with the network operator (e.g.,
Visa) that allows the bank either to issue credit cards to its customers or to process
payments from merchants. Because merchants do not contract directly with issuers, disputes between these parties may raise third-party beneficiary claims.
Sovereign Bank v. BJs Wholesale, presents a representative fact pattern.27 In this
case, credit card information pertaining to cards issued by Sovereign Bank was
stolen from BJ's Wholesale Club. Sovereign Bank sued BJ's for breach of contract,
alleging that it was the intended third-party beneficiary of an agreement between
BJ's and an acquirer that prohibited BJ's from retaining credit card information
beyond a certain period of time. 28 The Third Circuit held that a genuine issue of
material fact existed regarding Sovereign Bank's status as a third-party beneficiary
based upon the deposition of a Visa representative29 and a memorandum detailing
the purpose of the restrictions on retaining cardholder information. 30 Sovereign
Bank is notable because it provides a recent example of a court relying on thirdparty beneficiary law to enforce a credit card network contract in the absence of an
express contractual provision designating third parties as beneficiaries.
Standard -Setting Organizations (SSOs) form networks with members who
rely on industry standards to "establish technical specifications to ensure that
31
products from different manufacturers are compatible with each other."

26 See, e.g., Sovereign Bank, 533 F.3d at 164 (describing credit card networks). Cf A.E.I. Music
Network, Inc. v. Bus. Computers, Inc., 290 F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that when a
clear intent to benefit third parties exists "permitting third party beneficiary suits is consistent
with freedom of contract, and also reduces transaction costs by conferring rights ... on persons
without requiring the persons to become involved in the contractual negotiations").
27 533 F.3d 162 (3rd Cir. 2008). But see In re TJX Co., supra (concerning a similar fact pattern, but
reaching a different result on the merits); In re Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. Customer Data Sec.
Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (same).
28

See id. at 168.

29 The representative testified that "[[t]he purpose of the [restriction on retaining cardholder infor
mation] ... is to maximize the value to the Visa system as a whole." Id. at 169.
30 See id. at 170 (describing the purpose of the restrictions as [t]o protect the Visa system and Issuers
from potential fraud.").
31 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2012).
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Because standards may require the use of patented technology, SSOs often
attempt to prevent patent holdups by requiring members who hold IP-rights
in standard- essential patents to license their patents to other members on reasonable and non- discriminatory (RAND) terms. 32 These networks appear at
least somewhat effective in ensuring the licensing of standard- essential technology. Generally, only patent holders and the SSO itself are parties to the contracts; this requires other members of the network to bring suit as third-party
beneficiaries when they believe that a patent holder has breached its contract to
license on RAND terms. 33 Many members of SSO networks believe that the
promise to license patents on RAND terms can (and should) be enforceable by
other members of the network. In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., for example,
the parties did not dispute that Microsoft was a third-party beneficiary of the
contract between Motorola and the SSO and instead focused their litigation on
34
the issue of whether Motorola's proffered terms were reasonable.
Networks also exist between hospitals, hospital service providers, patients,
insurers, and HMOs. Here, for example, we find doctors suing hospitals or
insurance providers for the services that are authorized.3 5 Some cases involve
policyholders suing reinsurers as third-party beneficiaries of agreements with
direct insurers. 36 Perhaps the most frequent category are cases in which patients
sue as third party beneficiaries of contracts between hospitals and service providers. 37 There are also cases involving relatives of patients, notably parents,
38
suing hospitals in their own capacity as purported third-party beneficiaries.
These "hospital network" cases couch their discussion in terms of the "intentions" of the parties or the contracts involved: they have proved remarkably
hostile to third-party beneficiary claims. 39 For example, in a paradigmatic case

32 See id.at 876.
33 See, e.g., AppleInc. v. Samsung ElectronicsCo., No 11 CV 01846, 2012 U.S. WL 1672493 (N.D. Cal., May
14, 2012) (Apple alleged that it was a third party beneficiary of contract between Samsung and SSO).
34 696 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2012). But see Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 2012 WL 1672493, at
*12 (Samsung moved to dismiss Apple's breach of contract claim on the grounds that the RAND
agreement was an unenforceable "agreement to agree").
35 See e.g., Joseph v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2 of Parish of St. Mary, 939 So. 2d 1206 (La. 2006).
36 See e.g., Koken v. Legion Ins. Co., 831 A.2d 1196 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); Considine v. Reliance Ins.
Co., 35 A.3d 1232 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011).
37 See e.g., Jenkins v. Best, 250 S.W.3d 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); Dorrv. Sacred Heart Hosp., 228 Wis. 2d
425 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
38 See e.g., Ward v. Glover, 206 S.W.3d 17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
39 Koken, 831 A.2d at 1237; Dorr, 228 Wis. 2d at 450 (notably finding such a right for HMO sub
scribers despite an explicit provision of the contract barring third party beneficiary claims except
those "specifically provided herein").
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of a patient's claim of third-party rights in a contract between a hospital and a
medical service provider for the institution, the court held that the patient's
medical services were incidental (neither the "direct [or] primar[y]" reason for
the contract) and accordingly she did not have a claim as a third-party
beneficiary. 40
Third party claims also arise frequently in franchise networks. Here the disputes vary, sometimes involving claims by franchisees (either existing or potential) arising out of contractual obligations assumed by the franchisor in the
master franchisee contract. A few examples illustrate the typical patterns. In
Chu v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc.,41 the claimant was a rejected prospective franchisee,
suing on a settlement agreement between the franchisor (Dunkin') and former
franchisees. The relevant provision at issue stated that Dunkin' would "not
unreasonably withhold approval to a prospective transferee." The court
found that the purpose of the agreement was to settle litigation between
Dunkin' and the former franchisees. Thus, rather than being included for the
benefit of any transferees, the clause was included only for the benefit of former
franchisees who were parties to the settlement contract. On the other hand, in
Hawkinson v. Bennett,42 a sales franchisee brought a claim for a breach of the
agreement between the franchisor and master franchisee. The contract made
explicit mention of the duties of the master franchisee to other franchisees
established in his area, providing that the "demonstration systems" mentioned
in the contract were explicitly "for the use of the Sales Franchisees." The court
thus held that sales franchisees were third-party beneficiaries as a matter of law.
And finally, third party claims are frequently filed in disputes over defective
or failed performance in large construction projects where the litigation centers
on disputes between the owner of the project and various sub-contractors
whose primary contractual relationship is with the general contractor. Here
the courts are split. Some courts have held that the third party claim is too
far removed, creating only an incidental benefit to the plaintiff,43 while others
have permitted the third party claim to go forward.4 4

40 Jenkins, 250 S.W.3d at 696.
41

27 F. Supp. 2d 171, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).

42

265 Kan. 564, 594 (1998).

43

See e.g., Kisiel v. Holz, 272 Mich. App. 168 (2006); Fifth Third Bank v. Cope, 162 Ohio App. 3d 838
(2005); Pierce Associates, Inc. v. Nemours Found., 865 F. 2d 530 (3d Cir. 1988); Safer v. Perper, 569
F2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1977). But see Levan v. Richter, 152 Ill. App. 1082 (1987) and McCall v. Towne
Square, Inc., 503 S.W. 2d 180 (Tenn. 1973).

44 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. FireguardCorp., 249 Va. 209 (1995); A.E.I Music Network,
Inc., v. Business Computers, Inc., 290 F. 3d 952 (2002); GuardsmanElevator Co., Inc., v. United States,
50 Fed.C1. 577 (2001).
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We next ask more generally why parties form networks and what can go
wrong. The article then tests the predictions that follow from our analysis
against a random sample of recent third-party beneficiary cases. Here we consider whether the patterns of liability that we find in the cases are consistent
with the economic considerations we analyze. We also explore the factors that
allow third parties in some networks, but not others, to overcome the presumption against third-party liability.
4. NETWORK ANALYSIS

45

It is helpful to begin an analysis of the economic underpinnings of networks
with some basic terminology. Each agent in a network is identified with a
"node." The links between agents reflect their interactions; connected agents
are "neighbors." Network agents may or may not contract with each other, but
we analyze here the cases where they do. In network parlance, an agent's "degree" is the number of connections she expects to have. We assume that agents
can predict their degrees accurately but not the degrees of other agents. Thus, an
agent can only contract with one or more of her neighbors.
4.1 Strategic Complements

In network theory, agents' actions can be either strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Actions are strategic complements when the marginal benefit
that agent i realizes from an action is greater when more of her neighbors do the
same. For an example: "A network is a group of consumers who consume
the same good or a compatible good. The network confers network benefits if
the utility it provides to each individual user increases with the total number of
users. An example of a good with network benefits is text-editing software"
(Scotchmer 2004). In cases such as this, agents agree to make complementary
investments to develop a product: software, a new drug, a chemical reagent. The
complementary action category is general, however. Referring to the hospital
example above, the larger the patient population becomes, over a range, the

45

There is a well known problem when analyzing networks: "A critical problem for network theory is
that even simple games have multiple equilibria, so that a great variety of outcomes are consistent
with theoretical analysis. This naturally limits the predictive power of the theory and the scope of
policy recommendations, since multiple equilibria make it difficult to impossible to offer definitive
advice regarding how such labor markets, search markets, etc., should be organized (Charness et al.
2014)." We largely abstract from this concern because our limited goal is to see how third party
beneficiary liability would advance the goals of network members. Nevertheless, the limited utility of
the theory for policy analysis should reinforce the tentative nature of the recommendations we
make. In the Charness et al. experiments, the players often chose one of the possible equilibria. We
note when these choices are relevant to our claims.
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more the hospital can avail itself of economies of scale and predict its demand.
Reducing the costs and increasing the performance of the hospital, in turn,
makes the hospital a better resource for service provider members. Further, the
more hospitals that agree to join the network, the greater the payoff to the
service provider itself.
Formally, a promisee, P, agrees to pay a promisor, A, to perform an action x E
X that may benefit a nonparty B. P and A thus are contract members and B is a
possible beneficiary member. As above, x may be interpreted as making an
investment in developing something new or increasing service capacity. The
action is expected to cost c(x). If A performs, P gets the payoff
Yp = XA+ EUN, xj - z, where XA is the action of contract member A, Ni is the
set of P's neighbors so the second term is the aggregate action in Ni, and the last
term is the price P pays to A to perform the action. The notation indicates that a
promisee contract member benefits from the action of her contract partner and
also may benefit from the actions of other agents, who are in or later join the
network. The promisor A's expected payoff is yA = z + jNiXj - C(x); B's
expected payoff is yB = xA,+ Y-N, x*,, where the star indicates that B's benefit
may differ from P's benefit. For example, P may be a service provider who
benefits from receiving insurance premiums while B is an insured who benefits
from receiving covered treatment at a hospital. We assume that contract
member revenues are increasing in the number of members and that the promisor has convex costs. 46 These assumptions imply that the network has an optimal size.47
A recent example of a real world strategic complements network case is Peters
v. Monroe Township Board of Trustees.48 Human capital investments are stra
tegic complements when agent i's investment is marginally more beneficial
when others also invest. In the case, firefighters had to take a physical exam.
The investment was in the human (physical) capital needed to pass: other
firefighters, and their fire department, benefit when each firefighter becomes
more fit. The Trustees of the fire department contracted with WorkHealth to
2

46 Technically, we assume that c(x) = 1(xc ). A network may have many promisees, promisors (who
are supposed to take actions) and potential beneficiaries. The notation is in the singular for
convenience.
47 Network size may be optimal for the members but inefficient. For example, a network can be too big
or too small from a social point of view. For a general analysis, see Galeotti et al. (2010). We do not
consider the complex case in which network members cooperate in producing knowledge but
compete with each other in the product market. Consistent with the model here, however, in this
case network size is a negative function of the cost of forming links (i.e., serving agents), and these
networks also exhibit threshold effects. These effects are considered infra. Dawid & Hellmann (2014)
and Hattori & Hsin (2014) analyze cooperate/compete networks.
48

Dist. Court, SD Ohio, 2011

Google Scholar.
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perform the examinations. The Trustees probably assumed that firefighters who
expect competent examinations would be motivated to invest in health in order
to pass. In our terms, the contract members thus were the fire department and
Workhealth and the potential beneficiary members were the firefighters. The
plaintiff/beneficiaries claimed that WorkHealth arbitrarily lowered their health
test scores, leading to their suspension and loss of employment. The court
concluded that plaintiffs satisfied the pleading requirements for a third-party
beneficiary claim because the contract was meant primarily to benefit the
employees.
4.2 Strategic Substitutes
Actions are strategic substitutes when the marginal benefit that an individual
obtains from an action is lower when more of her neighbors also choose that
action. An example is commercially exploitable information. To illustrate,
assume a set of companies produce similar food products. Any of these products may become contaminated by a genetically modified strain. Each company
can perform tests to determine if its product is contaminated. Because the
products are similar, one company's test results would benefit the others by
increasing their knowledge of contamination, and so providing a better opportunity to reduce it. The companies agree with each other to perform tests and to
disclose the results. In this example, one agent's contribution may reduce the
need for other agents to contribute. For example, food company Pi may reduce
its research budget in the hope that company P will research more extensively.
A slightly different model is helpful for analyzing strategic substitute networks. 49 There are A agents, each of whom simultaneously chooses an action
x > 0. The notation x-i denotes the actions of agents other than i. Let x E [0,1]
represent the substitutability of agent j's actions for agent i's actions, where
x 1 is perfect substitutability. Agent i's marginal cost is Ki > 0, so his payoff
from choosing action xi is
U(o) = 1 i(Xi-Ejxj) - KiX i
An agent receives the payoff from his action, the first term in the parenthesis,
and the payoff from the actions of linked agents that benefit him, the second
term in the parenthesis. The agent, however, must pay his cost, the last term in
the Expression.
We denote agent i's best reply to the actions of the other agents fi(x i, x, G),
where G denotes the character of the network. To find fi, first let 7r'(x)= Ki:
that is, action x equates agent i's marginal costs to her marginal benefits.

49 What immediately follows applies the model in Bramoulle et al. (2014).
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Then maximizing the Expression with respect to xi yields50
(a)fi = x - -cEjxj if-cEjxj <x
(b)fi = 0 if cfEjxj >T
To understand these first order conditions, recall that x represents the degree of
substitutability between agent j's actions and agent i's actions when the two
agents are linked. Then condition (a) says that agent i's payoff is increasing in
the action he takes when the degree of substitutability is relatively small.
Condition (b) says that agent i will become inactive when the degree of substitutability becomes relatively large; his best response then is to let agent j act.
Notice also that as x increases (from zero toward one) agent i's activity level
falls.
51
An analysis of defection should also consider the effect of an agent's degree.
An agent's incentive to be active likely is decreasing in her degree. Intuitively, if
an agent has many neighbors, the agent may reason that at least one of them will
invest and this will reduce her incentive to be active. Conversely, if the agent has
few neighbors, she may reason that if she does not invest no one else will. Thus,
holding technical substitutability constant, the agent's incentive to defect is
increasing in her degree.52
4.3 Reasons for Breach
4.3.1 Strategic Complements

In the strategic complements case, agents breach for traditional reasons: they
realize increased costs or reduced revenues. A hospital, for example, restricts the
number of service provider members it will admit as care costs increase relative
to the fees the service provider has agreed to pay. Breach in the strategic complements case poses significant difficulties for courts applying third-party beneficiary doctrine and for network members.

50 Here, U(e) is differentiable, strictly increasing and concave in xi and the conditions for an internal
solution to agent i's maximization problem are commonly assumed.
51 Recall that an agent's degree is the number of connections with other agents in the neighborhood of
the agent's link she expects to make.
52 Francesco & Pin (2014) develop a formal analysis of incentives in these games, that derives the result
summarized above. The Charness et al. (2014) experiments find: "The observed effects of degree and
connectivity on activity support the notion of threshold equilibria, which implies a negative rela
tionship between degree and activity with substitutes, but a positive one with complements." See
also, id. at 1640 1641. The threshold equilibria in strategic substitute networks are higher than the
text above suggests when a member's investment increases the member's ability its "absorptive
capacity" to learn from the investments of other members. Nevertheless, above a certain substi
tutability level a member will curtail its investment in order to freeload on the investments of others.
See Correani et al. (2014).
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To see why, recall that a strategic complements network has an optimal size:
that is, the contract members' expected profits are maximized at a particular
membership. If actual costs or revenues turn out to be low, the network ex post
may want to serve fewer members than it anticipated it could serve profitably.
Using a little notation, consider the case in which expected network profits were
maximized at service quantity q* but actual profits turn out to be maximized at
service quantity qa < q* because the costs of serving third parties rose. Potential
third-party beneficiary members, however, may have (reasonably) expected the
higher service level. Because only ex ante expectations count, these agents
should recover the benefits they anticipated. Using the notation here, the network promisor should be liable for failing to serve agents in the q* qa interval.
The courts' difficulty arises because too many potential agents may want to
join to consume network services. 53 Continuing with our notation, let the
maximum demand for a network be qm > qt.Contract members do not want to
benefit demanders in the qm q* interval because they could not serve these
demanders profitably. The problem for a court, when a potential beneficiary
member sues a contract member, is to decide whether the plaintiff is in the ex
ante efficient interval q* qa, where he should recover, or in the ex ante inef
ficient interval qm q*, where he should not. Figure 1 may clarify this analysis.
Figure 1.

Revenue

Expcted M.C.

Actual

M.R.

q'

q.

qm

Membership

53 The theory suggests that this is a real danger: because network member payoffs are increasing in the
number of players, some possible equilibria of strategic complement networks can have too much
participation. In the Charness et al. experiments, supra note 53, agents tended to play the excess
activity equilibria: "The effects of degree are consistent with our hypothesis, as there is more activity
with higher degree with both complete and incomplete information." Id. at 1656.
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The solid convex curve represents expected marginal costs; the dashed
convex curve represents realized marginal cost. Contract members expected
to serve up to q* demand profitably, but can actually serve the smaller qa
demand profitably. The members never intended to serve demand in the
qm_ q* interval because marginal cost would exceed marginal revenue there.
It is difficult for a court to demarcate efficient from inefficient demand, as
seen by contract members, because marginal costs (and revenues) are difficult
for courts to recover. The courts' problem is also the contract members' problem: ex ante, the members want to encourage demand up to level q* and to
discourage demand above, but there is a question whether they can effectively
notify potential joiners that service is restricted to the q* level.
We return to these issues in Section VI when considering remedies, but as
prelude to our empirical study of the cases, our analysis here predicts that
courts will respond to the excessive demand issue by permitting third party
claims to proceed in some circumstances but not others. More precisely, we
predict that courts would permit third parties to recover (a) when the contract
between network members and the circumstances indicate an intention to
benefit the third party claimants, (b) when the beneficiary class size is fixed
ex ante, and (c) when the plaintiff has incurred substantial costs. In case (a),
the best inference from a contract evidencing an intent to benefit is that network members do not anticipate excessive demand-demand above q*. The
most important accompanying circumstance is the contract members' ability
to price the cost of serving putative beneficiaries. Because excess demand is
unprofitable, a network's ability to anticipate losses from serving particular
beneficiary types suggests that the network meant to exclude those types. In
case (b), there cannot be a danger of excess demand when class size is fixed in
advance.54 And in case (c), reliance is a good proxy for distinguishing efficient
from inefficient demand if a third party expectation that he will be served
correlates positively with the ex ante profitability for network members of
serving him. That the correlation is positive seems a plausible assumption
for a court to make.55

54 The Monroe Township case, supra, may illustrate the latter criterion. The number of affected fire
fighters was fixed in advance: the fire department employees. Similarly, courts are sympathetic to
third party beneficiary claims in franchise contexts. See, Hawkinson v. Bennett, supra note 50. The
class of franchisees often is fixed in advance by contract. In contrast, courts are reluctant to accord
third party beneficiary status to insureds who want to consume hospital services. See authorities
cited supranotes 43 47. The danger of excess demand seems real in the insurance company/hospital
context.
55 In Section VI below, we show that liability can be ex post inefficient in this case even when a plaintiff
is in the efficient q* - qa interval. This is because, as in the model above, the contract parties
sometimes do not require the third party to pay a price. As a consequence, a third party may sue
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4.3.2 Strategic Substitutes

In both strategic complement and strategic substitute networks the possibility
of freeriding creates an incentive for breach. There is a strategic substitute
aspect to complementary investments when the investments are informative
to others regarding costs or demand (Schwartz & Scott 2007). In this circumstance, the information that a particular agent's investment reveals reduces the
incentive of the other agents to invest. In the limit, an agent may delay its
investment altogether until she observes the behavior of the other agents. If
the project is revealed to be promising, this agent invests; if not, she defects.
Because every agent has the same incentive, the equilibrium may involve no
activity: so many agents anticipate defection that the network does not form.
Cases come to court, however, when network activity begins but defections
along the way derail the network's project.
Much the same analysis applies to agents that are linked in a strategic substitutes network. The agents may agree with each other to encourage everyone to
invest efficiently. The strength of the incentive to defect from such contracts is
increasing in the substitutability between an agent's actions and the actions of
other agents and in an agent's degree. When substitutability is strong and degree
is high, the possibility of defection may prevent a network from forming initially.
As the effect of these factors diminishes, the likelihood of formation increases,
and then the legally relevant case has the agents starting but not finishing.
This analysis suggests that when a network is characterized by strategic substitution, a plaintiff-a possible beneficiary member-will have invested in a
network project that did not ultimately form. He then sues other agents that
have behaved strategically by investing too little or by not investing at all. When
there is no network project, however, the plaintiff cannot sue for her expectation:
the payoff she would have realized from a successful venture. Some plaintiffs may
have incurred verifiable reliance costs, however. Hence, our analysis predicts that
there will be cases in which plaintiffs associated with networks sue for these costs,
and our analysis uncovers such cases. In contrast, in the strategic complements
case, plaintiffs also likely incur reliance costs, but may also have a provable
expectation. There is no reason, we argue in Section VI, not to protect it.
To summarize, the analysis here suggests four factors that courts may, and
should, consider when deciding whether a third party is a beneficiary member:
(i) the terms of the contract between the contract members of the network, and
the accompanying circumstances, (ii) material investments by the third party
plaintiff that support an inference that network parties expected each other to

though her benefit turns out to be less than the costs of serving her; the law, that is, can induce
inefficient performances.
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be beneficiary members as well as contract members, (iii) the degree of substitutability between the network members investments because the incentive to
defect is strong when it is high, and (iv) the defendant's degree (or number of
connections) because the incentive to defect also is increasing in her degree.
5. TESTING THE ANALYSIS: THE CASE SAMPLE
The network analysis in Section 1V provides the basis for both a positive and a
normative analysis of third-party beneficiary cases. We first address the positive
question by identifying the economic factors that apparently explain the case outcomes. Teasing out these factors is particularly important, but also difficult, because
courts frame their decisions in terms of the conclusory, and elusive, intent standard.
5.1 Initial Hypotheses

We created a random sample to explore the positive and normative factors that
Section IV develops. The case analysis tests three hypotheses: First, courts are
more likely to accord beneficiary member status to a third party when the
contract members appear sufficiently well informed about the beneficiary
class to which the member belongs to price a contract member's performance.
This hypothesis rests on the strategic complements property that adding beneficiary members increases the payoff of contract members, but only over the ex
ante efficient range. That contract members can price serving a particular beneficiary class suggests that it is efficient to serve class members such as the
plaintiff.56 Second, courts are more likely to accord beneficiary member
status to a third party when that party values the promisor member's performance highly. These are the strategic complement and strategic substitute cases in
which plaintiffs incur reliance costs. Third, claims by third-party members of a
business network against other members are more likely to succeed than claims
brought by third parties who are not in a network. Two reasons imply this
hypothesis. First, when network size is fixed ex ante, the problem of excessive

56 A second possible basis for this hypothesis is that a promisee will litigate a defective tender of
performance only when the expected damages award exceeds the costs of enforcement. Because

attorneys' fees and opportunity costs cannot be recouped in litigation, there is, in general, an
under enforcement of defective performances. As a consequence, the contract member promisor
will reduce his efforts to ensure that the performance meets the contract specifications by the

amount of the reduction in his expected liability from tendering a defective performance. If third
parties have lower enforcement costs than the promisee, granting rights of enforcement to these

additional potential plaintiffs will increase the promisor's effective damage liability for breach. In
this way, the extension of third party rights serves as a warranty that the promisor will expend
additional efforts to ensure that his performance actually meets the quality standards required in the
contract. And in that sense, a default rule extending a right to enforce the contract to particular third
parties is analogous to an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
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demand does not arise: network agents have already decided whom it is profitable to serve. The best inference this decision supports is that it would be
unprofitable to serve nonmembers. We thus predict that courts are inclined to
deny nonmember claims. Second, stepping outside the formal analysis above,
the forces that govern cooperation among the members of some business networks are durable, with trust and cooperation increasing with participation in
the network (Powell 1990). When there is recognition of common interests and
a high probability of future association, parties are more likely to cooperate for
mutual gain and are also more willing to enlist the aid of courts in punishing
defectors (Axelrod 1984; Powell 1996). We expect courts to be complicit in this
enterprise
5.2 What do Courts Actually Do?
5.2.7 The Random Sample

In order to create a database to evaluate the enforcement decisions of contemporary American courts in third-party beneficiary cases, we generated two samples from litigated cases between 1994 and 2014. An initial non-random search
for contracts cases that included references to intended and incidental beneficiaries yielded 3,045 cases. 57 Understanding that conclusions drawn from the
nonrandom sample were possibly a reflection of selection bias, we subsequently
performed a further, randomized search for cases that featured third party
claims. This sample, while moderate in size, provided a dataset that should
be, in expectation, an accurate reflection of US courts' current practices regarding third-party relationships. 58
To identify the population of applicable cases, we used the terms "third party
beneficiary" and "intended beneficiary" in Google Scholar's new case law
engine. 59 Results were limited to US state and federal cases decided between

57 Many of the cases are litigated at the summary judgment stage. In most of those cases where the
court denies summary judgment, it held that the third party beneficiary has the right to attempt at
trial to establish the facts on which her claim depends. Apparently, none of those cases resulted in
later reported litigation.
58 There is no way to ensure the external validity of our sample (the cases available for search using
Google may, for example, be of a certain type), but because we selected the cases from the popu
lation in a uniformly random manner (each case was randomly selected with an equal probability of
1/1,406), the distribution of any given attribute or variable in the sample should match the distri
bution of that attribute in the population.
59 Google Scholar's case search engine is a new and relatively untested method for formal legal research,
but we decided to use it over more traditional search engines such as Lexis and Westlaw for a variety
of reasons. First, a series of comparative trials between Google, Lexis, and Westlaw using a number of
potential search terms (discussed below) resulted in similar outcomes in terms of the number of
cases found. Second, Google proved to be easier to work with on a day to day basis. Third, and
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2004 and 2014.60 This process resulted in a sample of 1,406 cases. Using
Microsoft Excel, each case was assigned a random number from 0.000 to
1.000. Cases were then organized in ascending order according to these
random numbers. 6 ' The first sixty of these cases were read and coded in the
random order created by the computer. Twenty-five cases that contained our
search terms but were either completely unrelated to third-party contract
claims or were of a case type that were not of interest (most commonly dutyestablishing tort cases, attorney malpractice suits, or testate conflicts) were
excluded from the sample in addition to one case that had been drawn twice,
resulting in thirty-four cases of interest. We coded each of these cases for
whether the court found in favor of the third-party claimant (whether as a
final judgment, summary judgment, or a judgment on the pleadings); and
then coded the cases to test our three initial hypotheses: (i) whether the
third-party claimant was a member of a class or group either explicitly referred
to or otherwise identified in the disputed contract, so that serving the class
could be priced, (ii) whether the parties were members of a business network,
and (iii) whether the claimed losses were substantial.6 2

possibly most importantly, the free and simple nature of the search engine lends itself to easier
replication by outside researchers.
60 We explored a number of search terms in the preliminary stages of the research. Using "network
contract", "contractual network", "third party creditor beneficiary", or "business network" in combination with our base term, "third party beneficiary" did not yield enough cases to draw a suffi
ciently large random sample. As a result, we used "intended beneficiary" (a term used in the 2nd
Restatement) in combination with "third party beneficiary." After limiting the results to the past ten
years (2004 2014), we came up with the 1,406 cases used in this study.
61

We began with the terms "third party beneficiaries", "network contract", "contractual network",
"third party creditor beneficiary", "business network", "intended beneficiary", and "network." Not
surprisingly, "network" proved to be used in too many cases that were of no interest.

62

The vast majority of cases used the Second Restatement's distinctions between intended and inci
dental beneficiaries found in section 302 (1), albeit in varying ways. We made a number of decisions
in the coding process that may have colored the resulting data and subsequently, the outcomes of
our tests. First, we defined a business network as "a number of independent firms that enter a pattern
of interrelated contracts that are designed to confer on the parties many of the benefits of co
ordination that are achievable through vertical integration in a single firm." Second, we assumed
that if a case decision did not provide any indication that the group or class of the third party
claimant was explicitly referred to or identified in the language of the contract, then such references
were also absent in the actual language of the contract. Any explicit mention of the third party in a
contract would be an important detail in the courts' analysis (it is often the deciding factor) and
therefore, would presumably be mentioned in the decision. Third, any loss that was non speculative,
financially substantial, or threatened the ability for a firm to continue business was considered
"substantial."
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5.2.2 Data and Analysis

Although the small sample size and the judgment required to code the cases
accurately give reasons to avoid broad conclusions, nonetheless we find the
results broadly consistent with all three hypothesis. Even though the random
sample yielded only 34 usable cases, there were enough examples in each of the
two main categories (whether the court found third party status or not) to give
us some statistically significant data.
As Table 1 shows, courts found in favor of the third-party claimant in twelve
of the thirty-four cases. In eleven of the sixteen cases (69 percent) where the
third-party claimant was a member of a class or group explicitly referred to or
identified in the disputed contract, the court found third-party beneficiary
liability. In ten of the twenty-three cases (43 per cent) where the third-party
plaintiff claimed substantial losses, the court imposed third-party liability.
Finally, in six of the nine cases (67%) where the parties were members of a
business network, the court found third-party liability. 63 On the basis of these
results we were able to test all three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Intent to benefit a third party is found when the contract
members can anticipate and probably price the cost of serving particular third
parties. In eleven of the twelve randomly selected cases where the court was
willing to allow a third party claim to proceed, the court found evidence of
"circumstances" (including references in the contract itself) sufficient to support the presumption that the risk of increased liability for defective performance was appreciated by the promisor and (presumably) priced into the
contract. 64 These courts found that, taken together, the contract and the
circumstances justified a third party claim when the contract was essentially
a pass through to an identified third party,65 or when the third party was "a
member of a class referred to and identified in [the contract] .'66 On the
other hand, where summary judgment was granted against the third-party
claimant, the evidence revealed that the third-party interest in the contract

63 A few other findings may be of interest. The "average" year in which the decisions were made is
almost identical between the two groups (2009.7 and 2009.9), suggesting that there is little if any
temporal trend in the courts towards finding or not finding for the third party claimant. Of the eight
cases where the parties were part of a business network, six were working together as part of a project
management group (owner contractor sub), and two were part of an insurance network.
64 See e.g., Holmes v.Federal Ins. Co. 820 NE 2d 526 (Ill. App. 2004). In Holmes, the court found a
reasonable question of fact regarding the third party status of the plaintiff based on evidence that the
plaintiff was asked to sign the contract, and that the contract had details about the plaintiff's
entitlements, salary, and benefits.
65

Koken v.Legion Insurance Co., 831 A. 2d 1196 (Pa. 2004) (policy holder is a third party beneficiary of
the contract between initial "front man" insurer and reinsurer who held all the risk).

66 Hawaii Stevedores, Inc., v.HT&T Co., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Haw. 2005).

350

-

Schwartz and Scott: Third-Party Beneficiaries and Contractual Networks

Table 1.

Descriptive statistics

Group Identified (Hi)
Substantial Damages (H2)
Business Network (H3)
Totals

Number of
Cases in Category

Number Where
Court Found
TPB (Percent)

Number Where
Court Did Not
Find TPB (Percent)

16
23
9
34

11 (69)
10 (43)
6 (67)
12 (35)

5 (31)
12 (57)
3 (33)
22 (65)

either (i) arose after the contact was written,67 or (ii) indicated in its terms

that no third-party rights were to be recognized, 68 or, (iii) most frequently,
showed that the third parties were part of a large and undefined group at the
time of contract 9
Hypothesis 2: Courts grant third party claims more frequently when the beneficiary attaches substantial value to the contract performance. This hypothesis

rests on our analysis of the strategic complement and substitute contexts, in
which the plaintiff agents have invested in the network project but the defendant agents are alleged to have defected. We caution that the evidence to support
this hypothesis relies on the judgment required in hand coding the cases, but
nevertheless the cases are broadly consistent with the hypothesis. In ten of the
twelve cases in which the court allowed a third party claim to proceed, the
plaintiff's claim was supported by allegations of substantial losses. These courts
authorize the third party to go forward with its offer of proof when (i) the
plaintiff had considerable out of pocket financial losses owing to the defective
performance of the promisor,7 or (ii) the breach by the promisor threatened
the on-going business enterprise of the third party.7 1 In contrast, third party

67 Bariteauv. PNC FinancialServices Group, Inc., 285 Fed. Appx. 218 (2008); Cloud Nine v. Whaley, 650
F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Tenn. 2009).
68

Joseph v. HospitalService DistrictNo 2 of the Parishof St. Mary, 939 SO. 2d 1206 (La. 2006) (contract
with service provided specifies no employer/employee relationship and thus physicians are not
third party beneficiaries); Register.Com, Inc., v. Verio, Inc., 356 F. 3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (express
"no third party beneficiary" clause in SSO contract).

69 Ward v. Glover, M.D., 206 S.W. 3d 17 (Tenn. 2006) (patient is not an intended beneficiary of the
contract between hospital and medical director requiring him to ensure that proper procedures were
followed); Jenkins v. Best, M.D., 250 S.W. 3d 680 (Ky. 2007) (same).
70 A.E.I Music Network, Inc., v. Business Computers, Inc., 290 F. 3d 952 (7th Cir. 2002) (subcontractor
unpaid for $159,000 owing to failure of owner to require general contractor to post a bond).
71 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 2013 WL 427167 (N.D. Ill. February 4, 2013)
(businesses using patented processes can sue for "all foreseeable damages" if contractual obligation
to extend licenses on RAND terms is not met); Samsung v. Apple, 2012 WL 1672493 (N.D. Cal.)
(same).
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claims are dismissed on summary judgment when the plaintiff's losses are
speculative,72 based on "future earnings, mental anguish, grief and anxiety, 73
or, most frequently, when the financial losses were de minimus.74
Hypothesis 3: Courtsgrant claims by thirdparty members of a business network
more frequently than claims by non-network members. Hypothesis 3 is based on
the premise that when network members are an identified class of interested
parties in the bilateral contracts of some network members, class size is largely
fixed ex ante, so that the problem of excess demand is small.75 In addition to the
size factor, network membership has several key internalizing features. First, the
relational bonds that forge the membership create a natural affinity group that
is readily identifiable ex ante and thus more likely to be priced in the bilateral
contract. Second, the relation- specific investment in the network undertaken by
all members implies that the third party will generally attach substantial value to
the promised performance. Finally, the plaintiff's value in the performance is
also a function of her obligation to confer subsequent benefits on the promisor.
In such a case, she would claim the right to the performance only when her
value exceeded the later benefit. In combination, the size factor and these network conditions are consistent with the data. Courts recognized the possibility
of third-party rights in 50 percent of the network cases but only endorsed the
third party's claim in 13 percent of the non-network cases. (see Table 2, below).
The data also show that the success rate of third party claims is not evenly
distributed across different networks. The number of cases for any given network in our sample is too small to permit firm conclusions but the results
permit some tentative observations. Suits by members of a standard setting
network seeking damages caused by a refusal of a patent holder to
license the
76
patent on RAND terms appear to have the highest rate of success. This result

72 Textile Rubber and Chemical Co., Inc., v. Thermo Flex Technologies, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 89 (Ga. App.
2011).
73 Joseph v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 2 of Parishof St. Mary, 939 So. 2d 1206 (La. 2006).
74 Albe v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 3d 583 (2012) (plaintiff issued a traffic citation as a result of
defective cameras installed by defendant is not a third party beneficiary of contract between the city
and the installer).
75 See e.g., Sovereign Bank v. BJs Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F. 3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008) and cases cited in
notes to infra.
76 In re Incovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 427167 (N.D. Ill.) (promises for RAND licenses "plainly
contemplate benefitting users."); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 2012 WL 1672493
(N.D.CAL.) (same); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F. 3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012) (same). But
see Register.com v. Verico, Inc., 356 F. 3d 393 (2d. Cir. 2004) (express term in SSO contract with
defendant providing that "[t]his agreement shall not be construed to create any obligation....to any
non party to this Agreement....").
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may be attributable to the complementarity among the bilateral contracts between members of the network and the standard setting organization.
Similar successes by third parties occur in disputes between subcontractors and
project owners arising out of either non-payment by the owner or defective
performances by the subcontractor. In each case, the plaintiffs were relying on
bilateral contracts between the owner and the general contractor and the general
contractor and the sub-contractors respectively. 77 For example, in A.E.I Music
Network, Inc., v. Business Computers, Inc.,78 the court held that an unpaid sub
contractor was a third-party beneficiary, as a matter of law, of a contract between
the owner and general contractor that required the general contractor to post a
bond sufficient to assure payment to the subcontractors. Writing for the court,
Judge Posner held that when the necessary conditions are satisfied, permitting
third-party beneficiary suits is "consistent with freedom of contract and also
reduces transactions costs by conferring rights... on persons without requiring
them to become involved in the contractual negotiations." 79 Construction networks such as these are commonly circumscribed and thus the intended exten80
sion of benefits to non-contracting network members are clear.
Franchise networks are more attenuated and the litigation among the members (and potential entrants) is more varied. Cases in the sample involving a
third party suit against a party to the master agreement between the franchisor
and its franchisees generally succeeded. This evidence is consistent with several
earlier cases involving franchisees. In Hawkinson v. Bennett,8 ' for example, the
court held that sales franchisees were, as a matter of law, third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the franchisor and the master franchisee. Similarly,
in Int'l Pizza Hut FranchiseHoldersAss'n, Inc., v. Supreme Pizza, Inc.,8 2 the court
held that the franchisee association was a third-party beneficiary of the bilateral
contract between the franchisor and an individual franchisee and so was

77 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.FireguardCorp., 249 Va. 209 (1995); A.E.I Music Network,
Inc., v.Business Computers, Inc., 290 F. 3d 952 (7th Cir. 2002); Guardsman Elevator Co., Inc., v.
United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 577 (2001).
78 290 F.3d 952 (2002).
79 Id. at 955.
80 The recent case of Burch v.Superior Court,223 Cal. App. 4th 1411 (2014) raises an analogous issue of
third party liability in the construction context. The plaintiff purchaser alleged that she was a
third party beneficiary of the contract between the developer and the general contractor. The ap
pellate court supported the trial court, which found that "there was a triable issue of fact as to
whether the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the construction contract, and therefore denied
summary adjudication of the breach of contract count."
81 265 Kan. 5645 (1998).
82 464 F.Supp. 65 (D.Kan. 1998).
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Statistical hypothesis tests (t-tests)

Group Identified (Hi)
Substantial Damages (H2)
Business Network (H3)

Percent Where
Court Found
TPB (Number)

Percent Where
Court Did Not
Find TPB (Number)

P-value of
Difference in
Proportions (t-stat)

91.67 (11/12)
83.33 (10/12)
50.00 (6/12)

22.73 (5/22)
59.09 (13/22)
13.64 (3/22)

0.000 (6)
0.13 (1.56)
0.046 (2.16)

entitled to bring suit against the individual franchisee for refusing to join the
association as the contract required.8 3 Finally, in the case of credit card networks, the courts are split on the right of issuing banks to recover against
merchants whose failure to protect customer information permitted fraudulent
84
use of credit cards.
5.2.3 Statistical Hypothesis Test

Using the descriptive data presented in Table 1, we ran a series oft-tests on each
of the data-points that address our three hypotheses (see Table 2, above) 8 5
The t-tests in Table 2 support the three hypotheses. Cases in which the court
found in favor of the third party were much more likely (about 70 percentage
points more likely) to have claimants who were part of a group or class that was
explicitly mentioned in the contract (supporting Hypothesis 1). This difference
is statistically significant at the 0.000 level, meaning that we can be almost
100 percent confident that the difference between the two groups of cases is
not due to chance. Likewise, cases in which the court found in favor of the
third-party claimant were also much more likely (about 40 percentage points)
to involve parties that were part of a business network (supporting Hypothesis
3). This difference is also statistically significant, although the p-value of 0.046

83 Id. at 66 67.
84 See, e.g., Sovereign Bank, 533 F.3d at 164 (granting issuer the right to sue merchant for non
performance of contract with acquirer). But see In re TJX Co., supra note 16 (concerning a similar
fact pattern, but reaching a different result on the merits); In re Heartland Payment Systems, Inc.
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (same).
85 A t test is essentially a comparison of means that tells us how confident we can be that two groups of
data are different. A t test that produces a low p value suggests that we can be confident that the two
groups are statistically distinct. Alternatively, higher p values represent lower levels of confidence. The
cutoff point in the social sciences is generally a p value of 0.05, although this specific standard is
essentially arbitrary. It is important to note that, given our data generating process (non experimental),
a statistically significant t test does not indicate any causal relationship; it only tells us that the means of
the two groups of data are statistically different from each other. Also, t tests, like many statistical
hypothesis tests, assume that the pattern of the data follows a particular distribution. We do not know
the underlying distribution of the data, so we are making a (weak) assumption by running these tests.
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indicates that we are about 95 percent confident that this difference is not due
to chance. While cases where the court found in favor of third-party claimants
were slightly more likely to feature claims for substantial damages (about 25
percentage points), we can only be 87 percent confident that this difference is
not due to chance (which does not strongly support Hypothesis 2).86
Given the results of these tests, one might be tempted to posit some kind of
causal relationship. We remain very skeptical of any such suggestion, however,
because we do not employ any reliable identification strategy for our models.
We considered running a more sophisticated set of tests, such as a probit analysis controlling for additional variables, but we felt that doing so might lead
some to make inferences that lie beyond the limitations of our dataset. Such
tests can theoretically provide researchers with unbiased measurements of
causal impact, but only when a set of strong assumptions is met. Our data,
and subsequently, our statistical models do not meet those assumptions. Thus,
we are content to say only what the data indicate: that there are statistically
significant correlations in our data.
6. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: WHAT SHOULD COURTS DO?
In this section, we evaluate what courts should do in deciding third party claims
in contrast with what our analysis in Section V shows they actually do. In our
view, the courts are too restrictive. Our case sample shows that some third
parties do prevail in circumstances that appear to advance contract member
goals but other third parties are denied relief (either in whole or in part) in cases
where our normative criterion suggests they should be allowed to proceed
against the promisor.
6.1 Efficient Remedies

87

Third-party plaintiffs who sue in connection with strategic substitute networks
ordinarily cannot establish an expectation interest remedy. 88 In these cases, the
nature of the project the network was to pursue often is ill defined at the outset,
and there is no final project. A plaintiff, however, sometimes can prove costs

86 Sorting appellate cases by the size of damages is difficult because cases litigated to appellate courts
commonly involve substantial damages. Thus, our 11% confidence level may suggest a real effect.
87 We note again that we measure efficiency here as what best advances network goals. We cannot
definitely say what remedies would increase welfare all in all.
88 A plaintiff in connection with a strategic complements case also may have this problem when a part
of an agent's performance is informative respecting the profitability of other agents' performances
but the network project does not come to fruition.
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incurred in reliance on network member promises. Hence, in these cases the
remedy issue is simple: if an agent is found to be a beneficiary member, she
89
should be permitted to recover verifiable reliance costs.
90
Remedy issues in the strategic complements case are more complex.
To analyze them, refer again to the model in Section 4.1. The performing
party A should perform when total benefits exceed total costs: yB + yP > c,
where c is the performing party A's realized cost, the first left hand term is
the third party's benefit and the second term is the promisee's benefit.
The performing party, however, prefers to breach when z < c, where z is the
price P pays him to perform. For example, let z be the price a service provider
agrees to pay to a hospital and c be the realized cost of serving a potential
patient. If z < c, the hospital would prefer to refuse, or to truncate, service. A
potential beneficiary's-the disserved patient's-best response would be to sue
for his expectation, YB, whenever it is positive because he does not pay a price
to A. 9 '

Under current third-party beneficiary doctrine, ex post efficiency can be
difficult to achieve. In some cases, courts have permitted the beneficiary to
recover costs incurred but not her expectation. 92 Denoting B's costs as r, A
thus may breach when c - z > r: the net loss from performing-the left hand
side-is greater than the damages-the right hand side. Because rationality
implies that yB > r (the beneficiary expects to make a gain), awarding the beneficiary only reliance implies that the performing party breaches too often. This
analysis suggests that courts should be willing to permit the beneficiary to
recover her expectancy. But allowing the beneficiary to recover full expectation
damages may in some cases induce the promisor to perform inefficiently. As the
analysis below shows, the efficient remedy in strategic complement cases

89 Section 4.3 above sets out criteria that courts should use when deciding whether a third party is a
beneficiary member. A standard result in remedy theory is that the reliance remedy creates an
incentive for the promisee to over rely in order to compel the promisor to perform even when
performance would be inefficient. This argument exhibits the superiority of the expectation remedy
when a court can measure it. The choice here, however, is between a reliance remedy and no remedy
at all. The text above argues that contract members would prefer reliance to zero.
90 In the analysis that follows, we assume that it would be ex ante efficient for the network to serve the
potential beneficiary member; that is, the beneficiary is in the q* - qa interval.
91

B may have incurred reliance costs or paid the promisee but those expenses are sunk when B decides
whether to sue.

92

The denial of expectancy recoveries has occurred most frequently in cases where the contracting
parties have agreed to modify their contractual obligations ex post. In these cases, the beneficiary has
been permitted to recover reliance expenditures prior to the modification but has been denied any
claim for expectation damages. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311 and text accompanying
notes 109 11 infra.
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requires a court to reduce the award of expectation damages by the amount of
the price paid to the promisor by the promisee.
If the law were to protect the beneficiary member's expectation, A would
93
perform when c -z < yB; that is, when performance would be efficient.
Because z is positive, however, A also may perform when c > yB; that is, when

breach would be efficient. The intuition is that P, the paying party, subsidizes
B's benefit by paying the price to A. Therefore, the benefit that the contract
members intended to confer on B at the price z can turn out to be worth less to B
than the costs of serving her. Performance would nevertheless be efficient if
total benefits exceed total costs. There may be cases, however, in which the
promisee's gain is too small to overcome the inefficiency in the A/B relation. In
these cases, A would perform when performance would be inefficient all in all.
The inefficient performance concern would vanish if B could recover YB, her
benefit, less the sum t, where 0 < t < oc. Then A would perform when her loss
from performance is less than the (modified) damages she has to pay, or when
c -z<yB-

t

Otherwise, A breaches. Now set t= z. Then A performs when c < YB and
breaches otherwise. To see why this solution works, setting t = z, and subtracting t from B's gross expectation, requires B in effect to pay the price of the
94
performance she prefers.
To summarize, in the strategic complement and substitute cases the potential
beneficiary member should be permitted to recover his reliance loss. The existence of those losses is consistent with an ex ante intention of contract members to benefit such plaintiffs. In the strategic complements case, the third party
should be permitted to sue for her expectation, when courts can recover it, less
the price the network members created for the relevant performance. This will
help to ensure that the network is at its optimal size, where it serves only those
potential parties whose gains would exceed the costs of serving them.
6.2 Vague and Fluid Beneficiary Classes
As our analysis of the cases shows, courts are reluctant to grant relief to a

potential beneficiary member who belongs to a vague or a fluid class. A class
is vague when the contract members know the class's approximate size but
cannot identify many members in advance. 95 As an example, P may want to

93

Note: c < YBimplies that total benefits exceed total costs because yp is bounded from below by zero.

94 The price z is verifiable because it is a contract term.
95

As Section 4 notes, this is a common feature of networks: an agent at a particular network node
knows her own degree but seldom knows the degree of agents at other nodes.
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attract a particular group of consumers and hires A, an advertising specialist, to
offer certain deals to consumers in the group if they patronize P. The consumers
would benefit from receiving the benefits the P/A contract directs. The contract
parties-P and A-may be able to predict about how many consumers will
show up but cannot know in advance who they are. A beneficiary class is fluid
when agents enter and leave through time. The class size may stay approximately constant but again P, and perhaps A at the start, cannot identify every
member.
Excluding liability in vague and fluid class cases is inefficient when class size
does not exceed q*; then the expected cost of serving class members does not
exceed the expected benefit to the contract members. Hence, the members ex
ante prefer courts later to confer beneficiary status on third parties within the
expected class. The failure of courts to implement this intention rests on a
mistake. Courts appear to ask whether the contract members can identify a
particularpossible beneficiary and price the cost of serving her. The right question is whether the contract members can identify a potential beneficiary class
that is sufficiently distinct to price serving it. The failure of courts to ask the
right question materially decreases the law's ability to facilitate network formation and function because vague and fluid networks-networks characterized
by imperfect information-are common.
Two novel remedy issues would arise, however, if contract members can be
liable to potential beneficiaries in vague
or fluid classes. Regarding the first,
B
denote the total class benefit rOB = ElYb . Now let a particular member, say B11 ,
sue a contract member. The issue is how to assess this plaintiff s damages. There
are three possible rules: (a) Symmetry: each plaintiff is assumed to be identical
so if the class has B members, each plaintiff is awarded di = (1/B)RB. This rule
seems plausible when potential class members have a relatively common identity but may amount to no liability. The first plaintiff would have to establish B
and rB but could recover only di. If it is costly to prove the total benefit and the
total damages are relatively small, a potential first plaintiff may find suit not
worthwhile. But if the symmetry assumption is plausible, then no plaintiff
would find suit worthwhile and the equilibrium result is no liability. (b)
Individuation: each plaintiff must prove only her own expectation. In contrast,
to symmetry, under the individuation rule a plaintiff need only establish her
own harm, and the basis for liability. Contract members, however, may object
that they could not identify particular members in advance and so could not
price serving each of them. This response is unpersuasive. The contract members' best response to rule (b) would be to make a symmetry assumption for
themselves: because class members ex ante appear identical to contract members, the contract members' best assumption would be that each class member
would suffer a loss of (1/B)RTB on breach. Hence, if every beneficiary sues, the

358

-

Schwartz and Scott: Third-Party Beneficiaries and Contractual Networks

contract members would face an expected liability of B(1/B)TrB = rIB. This is the
right amount so individuation actually reduces to a symmetry rule with a reverse burden of proof. Under this rule, a plaintiff could recover her expectation
unless a contract member could show that she did not incur a loss. (c) No
liability: contract members are only liable to third parties whom they can identify in advance.
Rule (c) is inefficient for the reasons given above and rule (a) in practice
would reduce to rule (c). Rule (b) is efficient, and under it a plaintiff could
recover her expectation. In short, every remedy issue yields the same answer:
when contract members expect to benefit from serving a beneficiary member
class, its members should recover their expectation less the price the network
members created for the relevant performance. We also recall that some cases
enforce third party claims but create an interpretive presumption that contract
members do not intend to benefit non-parties. The analysis here shows that
there is no economic basis for this presumption, and that courts that follow it
unnecessarily hinder network formation.
Regarding the second remedy issue, the danger of excess demand apparently
is increasing in the vagueness or fluidity of the beneficiary class. In some of these
contexts, the contract members apparently could give effective notice, however.
For example, advertisements or other public notices may recite "Service is
limited" or "first come first served" or the like. When such notices likely
would be effective, the usual default should be reversed: that is, contract members should be liable when they could have given effective notice but did not.
When notice apparently would be ineffective, courts should stay with the current no remedy default. Potential beneficiaries then must prove that it would be
ex ante optimal for network members to serve them.
7. CONCLUSION
Third-party beneficiary law occupies an arcane section of the Contracts field.
The subject usually is treated in the last chapter of the typical contracts casebook (Scott & Kraus 2013); the books illustrate the subject with nineteenth
and early twentieth century cases; and the subject is seldom taught. 96 It has
attracted little scholarly attention. This neglect no longer is justifiable.
Doctrines that the early cases developed are outmoded because the transactions those cases involved did not create spillover effects. For example, P asked

96 Ferriell (2009), a standard text for students , recites: "Depending on whether your [the students']
Contracts course is four, five, or six credit hours, it might also cover the rules governing how a
contract might affect third parties: those who were not directly involved in its formation.. .. Some
Contracts courses, particularly those that do not last the entire year, never reach these topics."
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A to pay a debt P owes to B. 97 The promisor A's actions to perform or to
breach could affect only P and B. As the extensive case analyses above show,
however, the many-the very many-modern cases commonly involve transactions that create externalities. These cases are peopled with network agents:
potential network members who claim not to receive what they expected or
who incurred reliance losses, and defendant network members who are
accused of unjustifiably excluding potential members or of not pursuing the
network project.
Today's doctrine instructs courts to view the modern cases through a nineteenth-century lens. The legal question is whether the contract parties intended
to confer a benefit on the plaintiff. The courts' focus on intent yields some
sound results: courts enforce contracts that expressly say that third-party benefits are intended, or are not. When a contract is unclear, courts are more likely
to honor third party claims when the contract parties probably could price
them, when the contract parties can identify potential network members in
advance and when a potential third-party beneficiary has incurred material
reliance costs. Plaintiffs in these categories could hold a plausible belief that
the relevant network would serve them because it would be ex ante profitable
for the network to do so.
We argue here that courts should ask a different question, however: whether
it would be ex ante profitable for the network contracting members to serve the
potential beneficiary class to which the plaintiff belongs. A consistent judicial
pursuit of this question would facilitate optimal network formation and function. Asking the wrong question unsurprisingly sometimes yields the wrong
answer. Thus, some courts construe contracts with a strong presumption that
no third-party benefits were intended, and they seldom honor third party
claims when the contract network members can identify the class to which
the plaintiff potential beneficiary belongs, but cannot identify particular members of that class in advance. These results are inconsistent with the criterion of
network welfare.
It may be tempting to conclude that courts are relatively incapable of undertaking the rather more complex analysis that we propose here. Indeed, an extreme example of this view argues for a clear statement rule: there should be no
third-party liability unless the contract "expressly" so recites. The premise for
such a clear statement rule would be that the network parties do not want third
parties to win in the ordinary case, so third parties lose unless network parties
really want them to recover in the case at bar. To the contrary, our analysis
shows that such a premise would be groundless: sometimes network parties ex

97 These are the facts in Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
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ante would want liability and sometimes not. Hence, there is no good reason for
biasing the interpretive result against liability in general. Rather, the usual contract interpretive principle should obtain-implement the parties' intentionsas recovered with the aid of our analysis.
Nevertheless, our positive and normative conclusions are tentatively held for
at least three reasons. First, lawyers have largely ignored the subject so what
courts do and what courts are capable of doing in network contexts are largely
unexplored issues. There is not much institutional wisdom to exploit. Second,
the economic literature asks basic questions regarding network stability, how
agents develop and communicate information in various network types and
what equilibria the network agents are likely to reach. The answers to these
questions seldom are helpful to lawyers. We are concerned with the agreements
network members sometimes reach and the consequent issues of breach and
remedy. Hence, the economic literature to date offers less wisdom here than it
does in other contexts. Third, our normative criterion is partial: legal rules that
increase network member welfare will not always increase social welfare. It is an
open question just how wide the actual divergence is between local and global
efficiency.
Despite these caveats, we conclude with two claims. First, the issues raised by
third-party beneficiary suits in connection with business networks deserve a
more prominent place in doctrinal and in law and economics scholarship. The
demand for an increased scholarly focus on the nature and extent of legal
liability in network contexts is justified by the subject's practical significance,
its normative importance and its intellectual interest. Second, we believe that
courts should interpret the reigning legal standard of intent to benefit third
parties in terms that promote the formation and performance of contractual
networks. This normative criterion is more likely to survive a global regulatory
treatment than is the skeptical posture of current law.
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